Smart Border 2022 or 50,000 tons of steel and the road to nowhere

Recently, the slogans "wall on the border" and "perimeter devices" have become a catchphrase for decision-makers who explain that thanks to this the border will be tight. Well, it won't, because instead of drones, artificial intelligence and a crisis management system, we will have 50,000 tons of steel, thousands of freezing soldiers and a little perimetry.

Instead of propaganda - some facts and math

Let us recall: the planned border wall will be only about 180 kilometers long on the more than 400 kilometers of the border with Belarus. It will not cover even 45% of the Belarusian border due to the swamps and rivers. Being aware of this gap, Belarusians have already started to check the tightness of the Polish border in river and marsh sections (according to the 18th Mechanized Division), and migrants have started to push the Bug on pontoons. And what will happen in summer when the water level drops and you can swim here and there? Nobody replied how much it would cost us to protect the remaining 220 kilometers of the border with Belarus. Perhaps it will be necessary to "add" another billion zlotys or more. Besides, as life shows (for example in Melilla), overcoming the 5.5-meter fence is not a problem for migrants.

The government has also failed to present a plan in case the topic of migration spills over into the borders with Russia and Ukraine, which is also a likely scenario. Thus, from 1.6 billion zlotys in summer, they can make 3 or 4 billion or even more billion.

Another inconvenient problem is that basically entire operational troops have been assigned to protect only the Belarusian border. Hence, for some time there has been no information in the media about how many soldiers are at the borders, because almost all Polish divisions left the barracks along with the rotation. The question arises: is not keeping several thousand professional soldiers on the eastern border a special operational game of Russia, aimed at exhausting the professional army against the real challenge of aggression against Ukraine or the Baltic states? It is very probable.

It is also an open secret that if a similar intensity of migration took place on the Russian or Ukrainian border, we would have to ask other countries for help, because our Armed Forces do not have more manpower than there is on the border with Belarus. It is also not known how long the crisis at the border will last. What if it is spread not over months but over years? Is the current government committed to keeping thousands of soldiers at the border all this time? Even the opposition is not eager to ask these types of questions to the rulers, because there is no idea of ​​solving the problem itself, apart from running around with plastic bags along and across the border strip.

Looking at the numbers from the border alone, it can be concluded that its protection in autumn has not turned out to be as tight or as efficient as it is presented by decision-makers. As estimated by the Polish services in the person of Stanisław Żaryn (statement on November 9), about 12-15 thousand migrants stayed in Belarus non-stop. At the same time, the German police issued a statement that 5,380 migrants arriving from the Belarusian direction illegally crossed the German border throughout October, and another 1,246 migrants from 1 to 9 November. This wave subsided as a result of frosts, but simple mathematics shows that approximately 30–35% of migrants from Belarus had the opportunity to travel to Germany throughout Poland. These are not deterrent numbers for further migrant escapades. In total, almost 11,000 of them reached Germany by the beginning of December. How many to other countries - it is not known. And what if it turns out that 50,000 migrants will reach Germany in the spring and summer period, despite the wall? The myth about some protection of European borders by Poland will vanish like a soap bubble. And it will be a shame.

The Chinese wall, perimetry and the expected miracle

It is worth noting that at the press conference on November 4 at the Ministry of the Interior and Administration (MSWiA), with the participation of Minister Mariusz Kamiński, it was quite precisely specified that the cost of building the dam itself is estimated at PLN 1.5 billion, and another 115 million are to cost Technical equipment. It can be clearly stated that PLN 115 million will not allow even a thin technical line of protection of the entire 400-kilometer-long border with Belarus. And rather, it is only planned for 180 kilometers of the wall itself. What about the rest? What if the migration crisis spills over to another border? The same questions arise again.

When mentioning perimeter devices, policymakers are probably referring to Mindmade's AMSTA system from the WB Electronics Group. In 2019, it signed a contract with the Border Guard for the supply of six of these sets for a total of about PLN 4 million, with the option of extending it by another four sets. It is worth mentioning that the AMSTA system itself was not created for the purposes of border protection, and for the Border Guard it was modified accordingly. It was constructed with the military in mind, for the protection of bases, airports and key facilities. It is a very complex system (it can, for example, be combined with a minefield), the elements of which installed in the field (seismic sensors, cameras, microwave barriers, observation drones) offer many possibilities. It should be added that these devices are based on unique, Polish and neural network-based signal processing algorithms and state-of-the-art communication solutions. The whole system can be mobile, quasi-mobile and stationary, but "mobility" means two or three days of moving the system. The question is, does such a well-equipped AMSTA system want to buy the government?

The mathematical calculations show that no, it is rather a poorer version. This is due to the ASS acousto-seismic sensor network system and PSS strobe image sensors. The ASS mesh density depends on the distance over which the seismic movement can be effectively analyzed. Currently, it is around 75 meters for humans, meaning the sensors must be arranged in a grid no more than 150 meters apart. It is easy to calculate that the number of sensors along the entire length of the border should be ... 5,000, and for the 180-kilometer wall alone - half of it, assuming that the Border Guard is interested in creating two lines of detectors. This means that the government is unlikely to buy a rich version of the entire system.

AMSTA has one more disadvantage that is not mentioned - its operating range is up to several hundred meters from the border, so the system will not see what is happening 1-5 kilometers across the Belarusian border. The system will de facto remain helpless when it comes to detecting migrant smugglers operating on the Polish side of the border. Its impact is not expected 10–20 kilometers into its own territory. The great unknown is whether the system will include drones. Without their support, in the event of a great migration crisis, the system loses much of its usefulness.

At this point, it is worth emphasizing once again certain numbers: PLN 1.5 billion from the Polish budget for the construction of a 5.5-meter-high steel and concrete wall that will be overcome by migrants anyway, and only PLN 115 million for technical solutions supporting the Border Guard. And you can do the opposite.

Technique, fools, technique

It is not known why the government, which claims that it has been working on the situation since June, did not announce tenders for modern equipment for the Border Guard, did not order drones or artificial intelligence systems. He did not bet on modern technology, and the one that is off the shelf in Poland. I have already mentioned the AMSTA perimeter system. But he is not the only one who is needed at the border. First of all, you need drones and a Crisis Management System. Let me remind you: currently the Border Guard has four (!) Sets of FlyEye drones for the whole of Poland. Apart from these four sets, the Border Guard has nothing. And Polish companies really produce good drones at a world level.

Currently, the most recognized drone up to 2 kg of take-off weight is the MyFly by Asseco. Unfortunately, despite winning a tender announced by the Ministry of National Defense a year and a half ago, drones have still not been delivered to military units and nothing certain is known about them. Therefore, they may have a defect or have not passed the required tests. The cause of this situation is unknown.

An interesting solution in this regard may be the X-Tankcopter land-air drone by B-technology from Rzeszów, weighing about 1.6 kilograms. Although its civil version is currently in use, it can be adapted to the requirements of the Border Guard in a few months. The drone has the advantage that, in addition to the possibility of a half-hour flight, it is able to move around on tracks and observe the borderline from hiding.

X-Tankcopter II, civilian version (B-technology)

The Border Guard will find a much greater choice among slightly larger structures, the more so as drones were created directly intended for the Border Guard. We are talking about drones operating on a tethered, which allow observations for many days in different directions. Suspended at a height of up to 100 meters, they can see 10-15 kilometers deep into the territory of Belarus and thus recognize potential directions of movement of migrants and Belarusian troops, which would ideally complement the AMSTA perimeter system. The image from any drone of this type can be connected to any command center or even an ordinary laptop.

Such a specialized drone for border guards was created two years ago by Euro Projekt from Krakow. It is mounted on an Iveco 4 × 4 car, has the capability of tethered to a height of 100 meters and has day / night observation of the terrain.

The CableGuard drone by FlyFocus presents a slightly more mobile design, as it can be carried with any off-road vehicle. It can not only operate in a hover, but can also perform this hover on an optical fiber. Interestingly, the drone can be detached at any time to keep it working in free flight. This drone can also drop (or set on the ground) light loads - up to 3 kilograms. It can be purchased "off the shelf" or adapted to the customer's requirements in a few months, in terms of both the head and the lifting capacity. As a last resort, this drone, after modifications, can even be used as a mobile MANET radio.

FyFocus drone. As I was assured, the drone can, after some modifications, not only see day and night, but also its observation range can reach up to 15 km deep into Belarus (FlyFocus).

Atrax-Horus is another Polish production drone - the Air Force Institute of Technology. Until now, it was mainly used to train drone operators in the Polish Army, but it has a large load capacity, flight time up to 45 minutes and the ability not only to observe the terrain, but also to throw smoke or gas grenades or mark a crowd of people. Another proposal for the Border Guard may be the Ares and Hermes drones by Spartaqs. These are drones with a flight range of about 15 kilometers and a load capacity of about 5.5 kilograms. It is not certain, however, whether they can operate in hover.

Hermes V8M Dronoid (Spartaqs)

Inteligentna Granica 2022 czy 50 tysięcy ton stali i droga donikąd

The products presented above are not the entire offer of the Polish industry in the field of vertical take-off drones. There are a few more companies producing this type of devices that the Border Guard could purchase to replace hundreds of soldiers gathered at the border with drones.

The purchase of 30–50 tethered drones of this type and deploying them along the entire eastern border would allow it to be fully monitored in real time, 10–15 kilometers deep into Belarus. The cost of this project is approximately PLN 50-60 million (less than 5% of the cost of the wall). The army or the Border Guard would not have to chase the migrants, because long-range optical devices on this type of drones would warn about the places of their concentration or the upcoming attempts to break the border. It would be enough for the emergency intervention groups of soldiers to react in places identified by artificial intelligence as endangered and drones that would be the first to drop tear gas or other deterrents in endangered places.

By the way, a question arises about the sense of buying by the Border Guard further observation towers, which are not only more expensive than drones, have a lower observation height (35 meters and 50 meters) and weaker observation devices, are built as permanent objects, so it is known where expect them and how to cover them, e.g. by planting new trees or artificial smoke, not to mention the operating costs of such masts.

Unmanned aerial vehicles should play a different role. Here, it should be natural to increase the number of FlyEyes in the Border Guard, so that you could have 4-6 in the air non-stop at the same time. These are proven drones. But the competition is also growing for them, such as the Lemur vertical take-off drone. It is just finishing its flight tests and starting the certification process. Its advantage is that it can fly even more than 10 hours, but it does not need either a catapult or an airport.

The purchase of 10-12 sets of this type of drones would allow the Border Guard not only to control the border zone, but also to observe potential smugglers of people and cars used for this type of tasks in large areas. The fleet could be supplemented by the latest product of WB Electronics - the FT-5 drone, which, apart from optoelectronic heads, can be equipped with COMINT / ELINT sensors and even armaments.

Lemur - competition for FlyEye, in relation to which it has higher lifting capacity and longer flight time. (Flyfocus)

At this point it is worth mentioning that patrolling the border by modern air drones is as effective as patrolling it by planes or helicopters, but the operating costs are several dozen times lower. Therefore, the question arises: if the Border Guard can afford the purchase (from EU funds) of L-410UVP E-20 patrol aircraft (PLN 109.8 million in 2019) and Robinson R-44 and Airbus H135 helicopters, why was it impossible to afford so far to buy observation drones? Unlike helicopters or airplanes, they could simultaneously cover the entire eastern border of the Republic of Poland (!), The more so as funds for this have already appeared in the EU.

The supplement to the Border Guard for air or air-land drones should be typical land drones. The best known in this category is the product ZM Tarnów - a Perun wheeled robot with a weight of about 900 kilograms. Although it was designed as a patrol and combat vehicle, it could be adapted in a short time to patrol the Polish border. While research into it is not over yet, additional funding could speed it up considerably. The sensory instrumentation of this platform has been selected in such a way as to ensure the possibility of 360-degree observation and control in day and night conditions, as well as in conditions of significant smoke and dustiness. The satellite navigation system, remote-controlled observation head and 3D scanner allow for autonomous operation of the vehicle over long distances, self-overcoming obstacles. Interestingly, you can place tear or smoke granite launchers on this drone, and even a small water tank with a cannon.

Perun - a land drone from Zakłady Mechaniczne Tarnów, here with the ZSMU-1276 A3-ZMT weapon module (Andrzej Pawłowski, Konflikty.pl)

Another Polish producer of ground robots is PIAP. Here, unfortunately, robots for special applications dominate and their adaptation to the requirements of the Border Guard can be time-consuming and costly. The same is with the Rohatyniec robot from the Military University of Technology. The ready prototype of the RRB-01 reconnaissance and combat robot in the 6 × 6 system is at the disposal of WITU and the Polish private company Macro-System. It has a weight of about 500 kg and a similar load capacity, but the range (up to 2,000 meters) and the time of uninterrupted work on the installed batteries (up to 3 hours) are insufficient and require refinement. And for that, there aren't enough funds, because they are going to be steel and concrete.

An interesting construction was the Lewiatan robot, created in cooperation with Hydromega, WB Electronics and WAT. Work on Leviathan was advanced eight years ago. Unfortunately, the lack of interest of any services in using it ended the project. At the moment, it could be one of two or three robots that would perform a border patrol function. Question: does the project have a chance of being reheated? Experience shows that after such a long break - probably not.

It is worth adding that land drones could be a carrier of LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device) devices, i.e. producing very high-volume sound, audible up to 5 kilometers. Its main task is to emit sound waves that scare the viewer away, causing a very unpleasant or painful reaction. Such a device can replace dozens of officers in an intervention. Although it has not been approved for use in Poland due to the possibility of hearing damage, over 75 countries use such devices. Regulations may be issued that allow it to be used in the frontier zone.

The above equipment should be complemented by augmented reality. Currently, work is underway in Poland on AR cameras and tactical goggles. These goggles, apart from the loaded map, compass and GPS navigation, also have the ability to see at night and during the day, face recognition or measure temperature, as well as on-line communication with any command and communication systems. They can also serve as a translator from any pre-programmed language, a document scanner and, most importantly, monitor and transmit the situation around the user on an ongoing basis. Through this type of goggles, you can also get a view from drone cameras, a friend's camera or a camera from the AMSTA system. Equipping the Border Guard with this type of device would shift it one generation into the future. It is worth adding that the US Army made a decision this year to purchase a more perfect version of this type of devices (mixed reality) for the land forces for a sum of 21.9 billion dollars. And the purchase of 500-1000 pieces of this AR goggles for the Border Guard should not be a problem either.

The tightness of the border, however, depends mainly on managing it and having appropriate command centers reinforced with artificial intelligence or augmented reality. Here you can also find Polish companies that specialize in this type of solutions. Before we get into them, it must be honestly said that it sometimes takes years to put in place such command and crisis management systems. But who can guarantee us that the current crisis will not last for years?

The most advanced company dealing with command systems is undoubtedly Teldat from Bydgoszcz. It has a flagship project - the Jaśmin system, the variety of which, the Jaśmin Crisis Management System, is somewhat off the shelf. Jaśmin is a system consisting of specialized software and specialized IT equipment, enabling global crisis management - including monitoring the state of forces and resources allocated to crisis response - throughout the country. The system uses the so-called algorithms. artificial intelligence and augmented reality. It includes planning, support, management, coordination and control of activities, including: optimization mechanisms (calculation, verification and simulation tools). Interestingly, this system can work with military counterparts, such as HMS Jaśmin or BMS. In addition, it can be integrated with drones and databases, but it can also monitor individual people or suspicious vehicles. Of course, this is only part of its capabilities.

Another company with experience with solutions in this category is Comarch, which already five years ago developed its own command system: COMARCH C3ISR. In addition, it has experience in creating IT clouds and artificial intelligence systems. Its systems can, as in the case of Jaśmin, cooperate with drones and satellite reconnaissance, and have the ability to process and transmit data from almost all types of communication means. It is important because such systems of command and management of border protection can be connected to cellular systems and pick out all suspicious SMSs or pins indicating meetings between migrants and smugglers on the Polish side of the border. This would, in a short time, reduce the transport of illegal migrants deep into Poland and further to Germany to zero.

Part of the presentation of the Jasmine Crisis Management System by Teldat. (Teldat)

As for the means of communication, it is high time to equip the Border Guard with MANET broadband communication, which is more resistant to both jamming and eavesdropping. Such solutions are also available in Polish enterprises, such as Transbit, which in this field represents the world leaders. I emphasize once again that all the above-mentioned solutions are developed in Poland and are available in Polish enterprises. You just need to buy them. And the cost of creating the system will be half of the planned construction of the wall!

Smart Frontier - the best choice for a hybrid war

As I mentioned at the beginning, the situation at the border is only a prelude to the hybrid war that awaits us. And it will not be an event for months, but rather for years, and it will probably spill over into other frontiers as well. A rhetorical question arises - does the government of the Republic of Poland have another 20,000 soldiers in reserve for the border with Russia and another billions for the next wall, this time on the border with Russia or Ukraine? The answer is obvious: there are no such forces and means. In order to win the hybrid war, we are doomed to intelligent technology anyway, both in the media and at the border.

For example: the introduction of tethered drones will give us an online view of the entire border around the clock. In this way, it will be easy to expose any Russian-Belarusian provocations by showing them on the Internet and on television. Secondly: drones would act as a deterrent, because in provocations the Belarusian-Russian side would never be sure what the cameras recorded or what the drones could do and how they would react (for example, they could quickly enter Belarus's airspace, take pictures or drop food and drugs and quickly withdraw).

The media message from drones, e.g. from beating migrants by the Belarusian services or other events compromising the services there (drinking vodka, equipping migrants with firecrackers, and possibly also weapons) would be a huge media bomb. But that's only one side of how drones work. The second could be the identification of people thanks to augmented reality and artificial intelligence. With the help of the system, within a few months, it would be possible to identify all Belarusian officers on the border, as well as most migrants, especially those behaving aggressively. Psychological activities of this type have a wide range of effects. For example, an electrifying impression on Belarusian soldiers would be made by a drone flying a few meters from the border and greeting them by rank, name and surname, and for example informing that today they, and their families, are forbidden to cross the EU border. A similar impression could be made by drone recordings imitating, for example, approaching police dogs or the howling of wolves. These are just some of the psychological effects that can be achieved with drones. On the other hand, one could address individual migrants in their native languages ​​or play Islamic prayers at appropriate times.

As I mentioned, the above systems supplemented with augmented reality and artificial intelligence algorithms could seal our border in 95%, while the Border Guard or army service would be limited to intervention trips to places where the system expects attempts to break the border or where the algorithm calculated that such an event it can take 10-15 minutes. Then, instead of 20,000 troops, 3–4,000 officers of the extensive Border Guard would be enough on the entire border. Instead of a wall for 1.6 billion - light fortifications for about a fifth of this total, supplemented by drones, augmented reality, perimeter systems, command systems supported by artificial intelligence. The cost of all of this would be around 50% of what the government currently plans to spend on building the wall, and the devices could be rapidly transferred to any border or section of it. The enemy would never be sure where and when the drones would appear. And most importantly - to a large extent these solutions would be financed by the EU.

On November 23, in the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that Poland, Lithuania and Latvia will have an additional EUR 200 million available for border protection (i.e. approximately PLN 1 billion). These additional funds cannot be used for the construction of fences or walls, but for monitoring and border patrol vehicles. And these conditions are met by drones, which is even more in favor of Poland focusing on intelligent border protection systems and not on the "Chinese Wall" and thousands of soldiers freezing at the border.

It is worth adding that the dunes and border control systems can be easily adapted to the requirements of the army. They could silently perform a dual function of both the Border Guard installations and the military installations. In a possible armed conflict, this would make it easier for our armed forces to recognize the intentions of the enemy, and even to guide intelligent ammunition at selected targets.

Having a smart border would allow Poland to achieve two more important goals. First of all: show Europe that Poland is the only one to rely on solutions of this class, which would allow us to spread our products to other countries. Second: what Australia has achieved. The famous "ZERO chance" action on illegal entry into Australia effectively scared off those who were going to enter it illegally. Polish media coverage from the border with dozens of drones, people recognition systems, their quick identification or images of drones speaking in migrant languages, would clearly indicate that the border is protected by modern methods, and any attempt to cross it will be thwarted by devices from which there is no escape .

The only question that remains is whether the government of the Republic of Poland is organizationally able to embrace the construction of a smart border on the eastern frontiers of Poland? Perhaps, however, it is worth announcing a competition for Intelligent Border and giving Polish companies a free hand? They for half the price of building a wall on the border and EU subsidies would easily be able to do this project and secure the entire border with Belarus, not only its 180 kilometers. Perhaps there would be enough money to secure the border with Russia.

Also read: New Polish BWP - what should it be like?

Ministry of National Defense, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Poland